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THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND MUTUAL TRUST: COMMENT 
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM 
IN "On the Meaning of Trust,"' Professor 
Held has recently defended the interpre- 
tation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game 
vigorously criticized by Professor Tullock 
in his comment2 on three earlier articles by 
herself3 and Professors Wolff4 and Thomp- 
son.5 Professor Tullock stated: "The error 
is a bit subtle. Each of the three articles 
begins with a perfectly correct account of 
the Prisoner's Dilemma. . . . [A]ll then 
make statements implying that the problem 
is one of mutual trust. This is simply not 
so."6 Professor Held replies: "Along with 
others, I have described this problem in 
terms of whether or not it is rational to 
trust. . . . [I]t seems to me that trust is 
most required exactly when we least know 
whether a person will or will not do an ac- 
tion. And the Prisoner's Dilemma presents 
a paradigm of such a situation."7 
In her response, Held relies unduly on a 
relatively fruitless definitional discussion of 
the term "trust." Her disagreement with 
Tullock appears more fundamental al- 
though in one sense equally semantic: the 
disputants are playing different games. The 
Prisoner's Dilemma arises through associa- 
tion of individual utility levels with alter- 
native sentences. The basic matrix assigns 
years of imprisonment as a function of the 
choices confronting the parties involved. 
The formulation in Figure 1, for example, 
is appropriate when mutual silence and mu- 
tual confession respectively yield incarcera- 
tion for one year and for six years to each 
criminal, while either combination of differ- 
ing actions frees the confessing criminal 
and results in confinement of his partner 
for ten years. Here a and b designate the 
actions silence and confession open to play- 
ers 1 and 2. 
a2 b2 
al (1, 1) (10, 0) 
b, (0, 10) (6, 6) 
FIG. 1 
Tullock and Held would not dispute this 
initial characterization. Their differences 
are a product of attempts to translate years 
of imprisonment into units of utility. Tul- 
lock assumes that the value to each player 
of various outcomes is simply a decreasing 
function of his period of imprisonment. Ap- 
plication to the resulting schedule of the 
tautology that the individual will maximize 
his utility yields the traditional equilibrium 
of double confession. Tullock correctly con- 
cludes: "I may have the most perfect con- 
fidence that my fellow criminal will never 
confess without in any way affecting the 
desirability of my confessing. . . . In gen- 
eral . . . one prisoner's opinion about the 
probable behavior of the other is irrelevant 
to his own decision, since his payoff will 
always be higher if he confesses. . . . The 
problem raised by the dilemma is simply 
that if both parties make the same decision, 
they are better off if that double decision 
is 'don't squeal' than if it is 'squeal.' "8 
The utilities derived by Held from the 
basic imprisonment pattern appear super- 
ficially consistent with those used by Tul- 
lock. The matrix she adopts, reproduced as 
Figure 2, preserves the classic solution. 
Moreover, she asserts: "Clearly, if one can 
make an accurate prediction either that he 
will or that he will not confess, one can 
decide in accordance with usual recom- 
mendations for rational behavior. . . . If 
one can accurately predict that one's fellow 
prisoner will confess, the rational course 
of action is also to confess, thus minimiz- 
ing one's losses and avoiding the higher 
penalty of not confessing when he does. 
On the other hand, if one can accurately 
predict that he will not confess, the self- 
a2 b2 
al (5, 5) (-10, 10) 
b1 (10,-10) (- - 5) 
TFIG. 2 
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ishly rational course of action is to con- 
fess."9 
In this context other statements by Held 
seem incongruous: 
The interest of the Prisoner's Dilemma situa- 
tion, however, is in considering what course of 
action may be deemed to be the rational one 
when one can not know what the other fellow 
will do. . . . [I]f the probabilities concerning 
the other fellow's behavior are either totally 
unknown or exactly .5, then the problem of 
establishing which course of action would be 
the rational one is acute.... When the chance 
of success is exactly even, and we are con- 
fronted with a one-shot decision, should we or 
should we not take a chance on furthering a 
common interest while risking an individual 
interest ?1 
One would suppose that if rationality com- 
pels confession when the other player is 
certain to confess or certain to remain si- 
lent, confession would similarly be indicat- 
ed if his behavior is undetermined. This 
proposition can be simply demonstrated. 
Let prisoners 1 and 2 remain silent with 
probabilities x and y, respectively. The ex- 
pected payoff to each can be written as a 
function of these probabilities: 
Ei(x, y) = -5x + 15y-5, (1) 
E2(x, y) = 15x- 5y-5. (2) 
Thus: 
MIl 6E2 OR =at= -5. (3) 
Equation (3) demonstrates that El varies 
inversely with x for all values of y, and E2 
varies inversely with y for all values of x. 
Therefore player 1 can maximize his ex- 
pected payoff by setting x equal to 0, while 
player 2 can achieve his best position by 
choosing a similar value for y.11 
Confusion arises because Held tacitly as- 
sumes utility to an individual to be a de- 
creasing function of both his own sentence 
and the sentence of his partner. Thus she 
considers outcomes a1b2 and bja2 not only 
damaging to the silent player but also less 
satisfactory than mutual silence to the con- 
fessing player. This assumption has been 
incorporated into the matrix of Figure 3. 
a2 b2 
a, (5, 5) (-10, 0) 
b (1(?-10) (-5, -5) 
FIG. 3 
The game has been transformed from the 
Prisoner's Dilemma into an approach to its 
solution. Mutual confession is now an ob- 
vious equilibrium position only in the sense 
that it will be reached if each player seeks 
to minimize his maximum loss. If again we 
posit that players 1 and 2 keep silent with 
probabilities x and y, we may write: 
E1(x, y)=lOxy-5x + 5y-5, (4) 
E2(x, y)=lOxy + 5x-5y-5 . (5) 
Hence: 
d, l y - ty5, (6) 
lE2 10-5. (7) 
ay 
Given the utility schedules of Figure 3, 
each player can expect to gain through si- 
lence so long as the probability that the 
other will not confess exceeds .5. Here sup- 
positions of each prisoner concerning the 
choice to be made by his partner play a 
crucial role. 
a2 b2 
al ( 5, 5) ( 5,-5) 
b1 (-5, 5) (-5, -5) 
FIG. 4 
Further reduction of the value of unilat- 
eral betrayal or a lessening of its impact 
on the silent partner can yield an equilibri- 
um of mutual silence. The impact of choice 
by an individual on his expected payoff in 
the game of Figure 4, for example, is inde- 
pendent of the probability of silence on the 
part of his partner. Thus: 
Ei(x),y) = lox-5 5 (8) 
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E2(x, y) = 1Oy-5 . (9) 
Consequently: 
ME1E2= 10. (10) 
Each player will profit through selection of 
alternative a regardless of the behavior of 
the other. 
Where interpersonal comparison of utili- 
ties is permissible, outcome a1a2 is typical- 
ly taken to maximize the value of the Pris- 
oner's Dilemma game to the players jointly. 
That their gain through movement from 
b1b2 to ala2 may be more than offset by 
consequent loss to other members of society 
is indicated by the story illustrating the 
game itself and by Tullock's example of a 
competitive market. Where there are no 
counterbalancing external diseconomies, 
however, the community has an interest in 
converting the Prisoner's Dilemma game to 
a game such as that presented in Figure 4. 
One mechanism facilitating this transfor- 
mation is the law of contract. If prisoners 
could bind themselves through an agree- 
ment not to confess, there would be no 
dilemma. The state, by requiring payment 
of damages for breach of certain promises, 
permits individuals to elect such an escape 
in many areas of interaction. Another solu- 
tion, implicit in Held's analysis, would rely 
on socialization of the individual to induce 
incorporation of the welfare of others as 
an important element in his own preference 
function. 
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